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DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, July 1859.
BITSON VS. THE MANUFACTURERS' INSURANCE COMPANY.'
1. A mortgagor effects a policy of insurance against fire, which provides that the
insurers' liability should cease upon assignment of the policy without their consent: and that it should become void in case of the termination of the interest
of the insured in the subject of the insurance. Subsequently the mortgagor
makes an assignment of all his title and interest in the policy to the mortgageein risual Juxtaposition to the policy, though without the written consent of the
insurers, and a renewal is effected and premium therefor paid by the mortgagee.
Mortgagor then conveys the fee to the mortgagee.
Held, That the Court properly instructed the jury that if the existence of the
assignment was known to the assurers, the act of renewal included the consent
required by the policy.
Held, however, furthermore, that the assignment to the mortgagee only operated as an equitable transfer of the policy, and that the approval of the assignment by the insurers did not convert his contract into a new one for the independent insurance of the mortgagee.
2. The transfer of the property to the mortgagee, so as to divest the mortgagor's
(the plaintiff's) interest, has the .same effect as if the conveyance had been made
to some third person other than the mortgagee, there being, in both cases, a
change of interest in the subject of the insurance. Grosvenorvs. The Atlantic
Htt. Ins. Co., 3 Smith, 391, and The State Hut. Ins. Co. vs. Roberts, 7 Casey, 440;
7 Am. Law Reg., 229, approved.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CADWALADER, f.-The defendants insured the plaintiff in $1500,

against loss by fire, on a building in Baltimore, for one year from
the 14th of March, 1856. The policy provided that the defendants'
liability should cease in case of a total or partial assignment of the
policy, without their consent in writing endorsed upon it; and also
declared that the policy should become void in case of any transfer,
or termination of the interest of the insured, (meaning interest in
the building, or subject of insurance,) either by sale or otherwise.
It contained a provision that the risk not being changed, the insurance might be continued for such further time as might be agreed
upon; the premium for the renewal being paid, and its payment
endorsed, or a receipt for it given.
' We are indebted to the Legal Intelligencer for this case.-Bds. Am. Law Reg.
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The plaintiff, on the 12th of September, 1856, subscribed, on the
back of the policy, an assignment of all his title and interest in it,
to William Conine. This party's interest was under a mortgage of
the premises insured, executed by the plaintiff, to secure the payment of a debt greater in amount than the sum insured. This
assignment was made by filling up, in a fair hand, and subscribing,
a blank form, printed in large type. Conine and the plaintiff
resided in Baltimore, where the defendants had a resident agent;
through whom the abovementioned insurance, and the renewal mentioned below, were effected.
On the 14th March, 1857, the defendants renewed the insurance
for another year. Their agent's receipt for the premium for this
renewal was endorsed upon thepolicy directly under the abovementioned assignment. This assignment was in such visual juxtaposition, that the agent could not have failed to see the whole of it,
when he subscribed the receipt, without an extraordinary want of
attention to what was before him for inspection. It was proved
that Conine had paid this premium for the renewal of the insurance;
and there seemed to be no reason to doubt that he was the person
for whose benefit the insurance was intended by the parties in Baltimore to continue in force.
After this renewal, the plaintiff, by a deed, of which the existence
was not made known to the defendants, for a pecuniary consideration, in addition to the mortgage debt, conveyed the equity of redemption of the premises insured to the mortgagee, Conine, absolutely in fee.
After the plaintiff's interest had been thus entirely divested, the
building was, before the end of the second year, consumed by fire.
The loss thus incurred was of an amount greater than the sum
insured.
The defendants, at the trial, objected to the plaintiff's recovery,
on the ground that his assignment of the policy to Conine, having
been made without the written consent required by the policy, had
annulled the insurance. On this point the court instructed the jury
that the evidence would justify them in finding that the defendants'
agent, when he renewed the insurance, was aware of the existence
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and contents of the assignment, which was then, in effect, exhibited
to him; adding, that if the jury should so find, the act of renewal
included, sufficiently, the consent required by the policy.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. The court is of opinion
that, upon the point on which the instruction was given, the verdict
was right, and that the instruction, as to this point, was not erroneous. But the court is also of opinion that this is not the point on
which the decision of the case properly depends. The question of
interest in the insurance, as distinguished from that of interest in
the subject of insurance, was alone considered at the trial. The
difficulty in sustaining the verdict arises from the fact that the conveyance of the equity of redemption, by the plaintiff to Conine,
changed entirely the interest on the subject of insurance. As the
previous mortgage debt had, in amount, exceeded the sum insured,
Conine's acceptance of this conveyance might, possibly, not have
modified, substantially, his interest in the insurance, as it would
have been retained by him if the defendants had approved of the
conveyance. But, be this as it may, the conveyance converted his
interest in the subject of insurance, from that of a mere security
for a debt, into an absolute exclusive ownership ; and at the same
time, determined entirely the plaintiff's interest in the subject.
Though attention may not have been particularly directed at the
the trial to the effect of this change of interest, the defendants, if it
entirely discharged them from liability, ought not to be deprived of
the benefit of it on a motion for a new trial.
Another point which has been taken, on behalf of the defendants, is, that though an action of assumpsit, at the suit of Conine,
had been sustainable, upon the act of renewal, as a contract with
him, the present action of assumpsit by the party originally insured,
who, on the renewal, was neither the promisee nor the party to
whom the loss was to be paid, cannot be sustained.
If the decision in Tillou vs. The Kingston Mutual Insurance
Company, 1 Selden, 405, were law, there could, upon the facts of
the present case, have been a recovery in an action at the suit of
Conine. That case was adjudged by the Court of Appeals of New
York, in 1851. Three partners, owning a mill; in which they con-
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ducted their joint business, held a policy of insurance on it against
fire, which, like the policy now in question, contained a provision
that it should become void if the property insured was alienated by
sale, or otherwise. The policy was assigned by the parties insured,
with the assent of the insurers, to secure a mortgage on the mill for
a debt of less amount than the sum insured. One of the partners
insured, on afterwards retiring from the business, conveyed his
interest in the mill to the other two owners. It was destroyed,
subsequently, by fire. Two points were decided; the first, that
this conveyance, by one partner to the others, had, except as to the
mortgage, annulled the insurance; the second, that the mortgagee
was, nevertheless, to the amount of the mortgage debt, entitled to
the benefit of the insurance.
The decision of the first point, that, where partners are insured,
an assignment by one of them to the others, annuls the contract of
insurance as between them and the insurer, has been questioned in
a subsequent extrajudicial dictum of the same court, 3 Smith, 412.
But, the decision, on this point, has been followed in a direct adjudication, by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the recent case
of The Lycoming County Mutual Insurance Company vs. Finley.
In this case, the court said, "that a sale by one partner to the other,
is withiin the prohibition, cannot be doubted. .There is no exception
in its favor in the instrument; and the terms used give no reason
to imply any." These terms were the same as in the New York
case. The partner who, without the consent of the insurer, conveys
his interest in the subject of insurance to his copartners, gives them,
from thenceforth, an exclusive dominion and control where lie had,
previously, the right of participating in any control or dominion
that could have been exercised. He thereby ceases to be a protector of the property insured against fire from fraud, or from any
other cause for which the personal identity of a party insured can
be material to an insurer. The decision on this point, therefore,
appears to have been founded in sound legal reason.
On the second point, the decision was founded on the assumed
reason that the approval, by the insurers, of the assignment of the
policy to the mortgagee, had constituted a distinct and independent
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contract by them, with him, entitling him to the benefit of the insurance, in such a manner that his interest was not liable to be
affected by subsequent acts or omissions of the party originally
insured. On this point, the decision has been overruled by the
Court of Appeals of New York in the recent cases of Grosvenorvs.

The Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, and The Buffalo Steam
.Engine Works vs. The Sun .Z1utual Insurance Company, 8 Smith,
391, 401, 414. As the law of New York is now settled, the assignment of a policy of insurance against fire to a mortgagee, -with the
assent of the insurer, merely gives to the mortgagee the right of
requiring that the amount insured shall, to the extent of the mortgaged debt, be paid to him, whenever it would afterwards have been
recoverable by the mortgagor, if no such assignment had been
made. The approval of the assignment by the insurer does not
convert his former contract of insurance into a new one for the
independent insurance of the mortgagee. Unless the mortgagor
could have recovered, if no assignment had been made, there can
be no recovery of the insurance by or for the mortgagee. Therefore, a subsequent alienation of the equity of redemption by the
mortgagor, made before any loss by fire without the consent or approval of the insurer, annuls the insurance as to both mortgagor
and mortgagee.
The cases reported in 7 Casey, 430; 8 Cushing, 133, 136, 137,
and 10 Cushing, 352, 353, show that a like doctrine on the subject
prevails in Pennsylvania and in Massachusetts. In 16 Peters, 501,
502, Judge Story, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court,
said that if "a mortgagor procures a policy on the property against
fire, and he afterwards assigns the policy to the mortgagee, -with
the consent of the underwriters (if that is required by the contract
to give it validity) as collateral security, that assignment operates
solely as an equitable transfer of the policy, so as to enable the
mortgagee to recover the amount due in case of loss. But, it does
not displace the interest of the mortgagor in the premises insured.
On the contrary, the insurance is still his insurance, and on his property, and for his account. And so essential is this, that if the
mortgagor should transfer the property to a third person, without
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the consent of the underwriters so as to divest all his interest therein, and then a loss should occur, no recovery can be had therefor
against the underwriters, because the assured has ceased to have
any interest therein, and the purchaser has no right or interest in
the policy."
Consequently, if in the present case, the conveyance which divested
the plaintiff's interest had been to another person than th& mortgagee, the insurance would, from the date of such conveyance, have
been to all intents and purposes, at an end. The authorities define
so clearly the rule of decision and the principle from which it is
deduced, that we would not be at liberty to consider the convenience
or expediency of the rule, or to inquire into probabilities of justice,
or injustice, in the result of its ordinary application.
The comparative magnitudes of the mortgage debt and the sum
insured, cannot affect the question of the application of the rule.
Nor can its application be affected by the circumstance that the
person to whom the absolute conveyance in fee has been made, was
the same party to whom the policy had been previously assigned
with the assent of the insurers. If the question depends upon the
change of interest, not the insurance, but in the subject of insurance,
these distinctions cannot be attended with any material difference.
We have seen that the approval by the defendants of the assignment
of the policy to Conine, though a recognition of him as the substitute of the plaintiff to receive the payment of a loss, had not been
a dispensation with any former condition of the contract as to a
change in the ownership of the subject of insurance. In two of the
cases which have been cited, the transfer by a partner to his copartners of his interest in an insurance of property of their firm had
introducc no new person as a party insured. The doubt in those
cases did not arise from the identity of the person, but from the
identity of the character of the interest which, by the transfer, had
been changed, as to the remaining partners, in proportion, but not
in kind, though it had been absolutely determined as to the retiring
partner.
In the present case, not only was the plaintiff's interest, and with
it, his protective dominion and control, forever determined by the

MARKET BANK OF TROY vs. SMITH AND OTHERS.

conveyance in question; but this dominion and control were irrevocably vested in Conine, by whom they could not previously have
been exercised; and the character of whose interest was thus entirely changed. His personal identity as mortgagee was, therefore, so far as the reason of the rule is concerned, immaterial.
The case thus appears to be completely covered by the authorities. They show that there could not be a recovery of the insurance in an action at the suit of either Conine, or the present plaintiff. The verdict must, therefore, be set aside, and a new trial
ordered.
GRIER, J.-I
fully concur with my brother Cadwalader in all his
views, as above expressed'

In the .District Court of the United States for the District of
Wisconsin.
THlE IMARKET BANX OF TROY vs. JOHN B. SMITH, GARRET VLIET, J&SPER
VLIET AND DANIEL H. RICHARDS.

1. The statute of the State of New York, that no corporation shall interpose the
defence of usury, does not extend to suits against accommodation endorsers for
corporations.
2. Where the law of a State forbids a corporation taking over a certain amount of
interest, is a contract for a greater amount void ?

If not void, the surplus inte-

rest paid should be credited to the debtor, as not collectable.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-This suit is against the defendants as endorsers of
a promissory note, of which the following is a copy:
$20,000.

Orrc

OF THE MILWAUKEE AND Hoascox R. I. Co.,
dlilwaukee, Wi., .March 23d, 1858.

Three months after date for value received, the Milwaukee and Horicon Railroad
Company promise to pay to the order of J. B. Smith, Jasper Vliet, Garret Vliet,
and Daniel H. Richards, with interest, twenty thousand dollars, payable at the
American Exchange Bank, in New York; having deposited herewith as collateral

security, with authority to sell the same on the non-performance of their promise,
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;n such manner as the holder hereof may deem proper, either at public or private
sale, and apply the proceeds hereon, sixty of the first mortgage bonds of this company of one thousand dollars each, payable in 1878, with the coupons that fall due
November 1, 1857, attached.
E dorsed.
Milwaukee 4- ioricon Railroad Company. by
J. B. SMITE,
J. B. SM!ITH. .President.
JASPER VLIET,
GAnnET VLIET,

D. H.

RICHARDS.

This note was given to the Market Bank in lieu of other notes,
amounting in the aggregate to the sum of twenty thousand dollars,
that had been previously negotiated at the bank. The negotiation
for a loan on those notes to the company was commenced at the
instance of the company, through a resident of Milwaukee, who
was a relative of the cashier of the bank. By a private agreement,
interest at the rate of seven per cent. was paid, and exchange, and
also a bonus to the agent, which was divided between the agent and
the cashier of the bank. The exchange was charged -and paid, at
the rate of exchange between Milwaukee and New York, which
was much higher than that between Troy and New York. On the
giving of the note in suit, the same conditions were contemplated,
but they were not carried out. The agent received the collaterals
and the bank holds them.
The plaintiff is a banking association under the general banking
law of the State of New York, located in the city of Troy; where
it can do business, and not elsewhere. This was a contract made
and executed in the State of New York; and it must be controlled
by the laws of that state. By those laws, the rate of interest upon
the loan or forbearance of money is seven lper cent. And no person or corporation shall directly or indirectly take or receive, in
money, or in any other way any greater sum. And all bonds, bills,
notes, assurances, conveyances, and all other contracts or securities
whatsoever, (except bottomry and respondentia bonds or contracts)
and all deposits of goods, or other things whatsoever, whereupon
or whereby there shall be reserved or taken, or secured, or agreed
to be reserved or taken any greater sum or greater value for the
loan or forbearance of any money, &c., shall be void; and any per-
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son receiving interest in violation of the law, shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by a fine or
imprisonment. In April 1850, an act was passed, that no corporation shall hereafter interpose the defense of usury in any action.
Associations formed under the general banking law of the State
of New York, according to decisions of the courts of that State, are
not bodies corporate and politic within the spirit and meaning of the
Constitution of the State; but they are nevertheless corporations
for all practical purposes. And they are subject to the general laws
of the State regulating the rate of interest. The books of reports
of the State contain many cases in favor of and against banks and
banking institutions involving the question of usury.
The proof shows that the original notes were given to the bank
by the Railroad Company, endorsed by these defendants as payees,
on a loan of money by the bank to the company. If the original
notes were void for usury, the note in suit is to be considered void.
Armstrong vs. Toler, 11 Wheaton, 258; Jackson vs. Packard, 6
Wend. 415; Tuthill vs. Davis, 20 John. 285; Andrews vs. Pond,
13 Peters, 65; Walker vs. The Bank of Washington, 3 Howard,
62. If the charge for exchange was a cover for usury, the contract was usurious and void.
In the case of Leavitt vs. Curtis, 15 N. Y. Rep., 9, it is decided,
in effect, that under the act of April 1850, a corporation cannot
set up usury in any way to defeat a contract otherwise valid. And
in the Southern'Life Insurance and Trust Company vs. Packer,
17 N. Y., 51, it is decided that the act applies to foreign corporations litigating in the courts of that State. In the opinion, the
court use, in reference to the act, the words "this partial repeal
of the usury laws." The act is not to be considered a repeal of
those laws, but merely a prohibition of the defense of usury, on the
part of corporations, in the courts of the State. It is not intimated
in either of the cases, that the act was intended to include accommodation endorsers for corporations. The contract or transaction
may be usurious; but that shall not be allowed to be pleaded in the
courts of the State, by a corporation. Corporations alone are prohibited from interposing the defense of usury. The system of the
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usury laws of New York, for the protection of individuals makes
usurious contracts void; but the contracts of corporations are made
an exception, by the act, merely to the extent of their interposing
the plea of usury in the courts. The act declares it to be the policy
.of the State to withhold protection only from corporations. The
act does not make contracts of coporations, to give more than seven
per cent. interest, valid. It merely withdraws protection from cor.porations. The usury laws are left in full force against the lender.
The note of the Railroad Company, and the endorsement of the
.defendants, were but one transaction. The endorsers were essen,tial parties to the tranaction. If the act had prohibited the defense
on all contracts of corporations, then the defendants might be included in the prohibition. The defendants are so far parties to the
note, as accommodation endorsers, that they may object to its payment for usury. Jones vs. Hoke, 2 Johns. 0., 60; Wilkie vs. .Roosevelt, 3 Johns. 0., 206; 11 Wend. 329; 8 Paige, 641; 9 Id., 197;
7 Id., 602.
In the case of Bock vs. Lauman, 24 Penna. State Rep., 435, it
is decided that a bill of exchange drawn at Buffalo, by the agent of
a Railroad Company, to the order of the President of the Company,
and endorsed by the defendant when it was negotiated in New York,
on an usurious loan, was void as to the endorsers; although by the
act of "1850, it should be valid against the company. That is the
only adjudicated case on this subject. And, although it is not of
equal authority with a decision of the Court of *Appeals of New
York, upon the construction and force of a statute of that State,
yet it is a decision of a highly respectable court, and worthy of favor*able consideration.
The law of the State of New York in the most positive terms
forbids corporations from receiving a greater amount of interest
than seven per cent.
It was argued by counsel, that independent of the penalty for
usury, the note in suit should be considered void as a contract for a
,greater amount of interest than a corporation was allowed by law
.to receive. In the case of _Pleckner vs. The Bank of the United
States, 8 Wheat,, 338, the court say: "The act incorporating the
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Bank of the United States does not avoid securities, on which usurious interest may have been taken; and the usury laws of the State
cannot be set up as a defense to a note, on which it is taken. It is
merely a violation of the charter for which a remedy may be applied
by the government." But in the subsequent case of the Bank of
the United States vs. Owens, 2 Peters, 527, the court decide that
such a contract and loan on the part of the bank are void on general principles. The court remark: " Courts of Justice are instituted to carry into effect the laws of a country, and they cannot
become auxiliary to the violation of these laws. There can be no
civil right, where there can be no legal remedy; and there can be
no legal remedy for that which is in itself illegal." Such has also
been the rulings of the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Bank of
Chillicothe vs. Swayne, 8 Ohio Rep., 257; Creed vs. The Commercial Bankc of Cincinnati, 11 Id., 489 ; !Inhe Miami Exchange Company vs. Clark, 13 Id., 1, also in 5 Connecticut Rep., 560. It is
well understood that a corporation created by statute is a mere
creature of the law; and can exercise no powers, except those which
the law confers upon it, or which are incident to its existence. Head
and Amory vs. The Providence Insurance Company, 2 Cranch,
127; The Bank of the United States vs. Dandridge, 12 Wheat.,
64; The Bank of Augusta vs. Earle, 13 Peters, 587; Perrinevs.
The Chesapeake and -DelawareCanal Company, 9 Howard, 172;
Pearce vs. The Madison and IndianapolisRailroad Company, 21
Howard, 441. Whenever a corporation makes a contract, it is a
contract of the legal entity of the artificial being created by its
charter. The only right it can claim are the rights which are given
to it in that character. A corporation can make no contracts and
do no acts, except such as are authorized by its charter; and those
acts must be done by such officers or agents, and in such manner as
the charter authorizes. The public have an interest, that banks
shall not impose upon the necessities of their customers. Banks
are created for the accommodation of the public, and they should
not be allowed to assume a power of oppression. It is not the duty
of the courts to lend their aid in carrying out contracts of banks,
prohibited by their charter, or the laws of their State. Public
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policy as well as public interest require that usurious contracts, or
loans of banks upon an amount of interest forbidden by law, should
not be enforced by the courts. But as I have come to the conclusion,
that these defendants can plead, in their discharge, the law of the
State of New York against usury, it is not necessary to consider
further this last subject. At all events, the surplus interest paid
over the legal rate, should be credited to the debtor, as not collectable.

1k the Supreme Gourt of the State of Tennessee, at .Nashville,
-December Term, 1858.
CORNELIUS FARRIS VS.

KIRKPATRICK'S HEIRS AND ADMINISTRATOR.

Where partners make a settlement under the sanction of an award of referees, and
certain conveyances are made in pursuance of such settlement, and it afterwards
turns out, upon a second reference, that the partnership dealings and accounts
are adjusted in another manner by reason of a mistake in the first reference, but the
matter of the division of certain land was not brought before the second reference,
equity will enjoin, by perpetual injunction, an action of ejeetment brought by
one against the other.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARUTHERS, J.-Complainant and John Fitzpatrick, defendant's
intestate, were partners for several years in a saw and grist mill.
In December, 1853, they made an agreement in the settlement of
their affairs, which was reduced to writing. After this, in March,
1854, they made a reference to arbitrators of all matters in controversy between them at that time, by whom an award and final
settlement was made, which, it is said, was satisfactory, and the
parties acquiesced in it. It seems that the difficulty which produced
this suit arose out of the construction of the award and settlement,
as to their extent and effect.
The settlement of 1853 is signed by the parties and attested by
two witnesses, and is thus briefly stated by them: "1We find upon
a full settlement that Farris is indebted to said firm 82,802 81, and
that Fitzpatrick is not indebted to said firm.
Said Fitzpatrick
takes the tract of land known as the 'Peter tract,' and another
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known as the ' Riley tract,' and said Farris is to have the ' Mill
Place,' upon paying Fitzpatrick $1,485 40." Each party took
possession accordingly. The deeds for all these lands had been
made to Fitzpatrick individually, but it is admitted on all hands
that they were paid for out of the firm means, and consequently
were partnership property.
It seems that the parties were not satisfied with their settlement
of 1853, and in March, 1854, submitted their accounts to four competent friends to review, and finally adjust them. This was done
upon a laborious examination, and the result was, as stated in writing, that Farris, instead of being indebted to the firm $2,802, as
supposed in their previous settlement, only owed it $12 62, which
was then paid. Upon this award the parties say in writing, on the
same day, "We, the undersigned, agree to the settlement of which
the within is a condensed statement, as a final conclusion of our old
partnership. March 3, 1854."
It is proved that the matter of the division of the land was not
brought before these referees, as that was not understood to be in
question, having been previously divided by the parties; but only
their accounts were in dispute. There can be no doubt but that
such was the understanding of the parties ; that they were content
with the division they had made, but only differed about. their partnership dealings and accounts, which alone were submitted, to; the
arbitrators.
Very soon after this, Fitzpatrick instituted his action of ejeotment
against Farris upon his legal title. To perpetually enjoin that
action, and compel Fitzpatrick to make him a title under their
agreement in writing of December, 1853, as to the division of their
partnership lands, this bill was filed.
Can the object and prayer of this bill, upon the facts we have:
stated, be resisted ? The Chancellor thought not, and so do we.
The objections of the defendant are all untenable.
1. The argument is unsound, that under the statute of frauds, a&,
expressed in the case of Shield vs. Stamps, 2 Sneed, 272, and the
authorities there cited, in relation to the necessity of setting forth
in the writing the particulars of the contract, would render this
43
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writing void. This doctrine does not apply to a case like this.
There the lands belonged to the parties as a firm, and were well
described in the deeds, and nothing more was required in a division
between themselves, but to designate the tracts assigned to each by
such terms as would be well understood, or the general application
by which they were known. The "Peter tract," the " Riley tract,"
and the "Mill tract," were sufficient. If any uncertainty or ambiguity existed, it could only be explained by parol.
If there were two mill tracts, proof would be required to ascertain which was meant. But here there was but one "mill tract"
owned by the firm, and there is no uncertainty.
2. The $1,480 to be paid by Farris was no part of the consideration, nor a condition to the transfer of that tract. It is manifest
from the circumstances, that the division of the lands had no connection with that matter. By the mistake of the parties it was
then supposed that Farris was indebted to the firm $2,800, to the
half of which Fitzpatrick was entitled, and that was stated in connection with the partition of their lands, and it may be that the
latter intended in this way to secure a lien upon half of the land
assigned to the former for its payment; and that would be unobjectionable if such was the object, and it was properly done. But
then it turn'd out afterwards, by the award of arbitrators, that this
was all a Inistake, and nothing at all was due from Farris to his
partner. This certainly removed all difficulty on that point, and
left the title to the mill tract unencumbered under the previous
written agreement.
It appears that Fitzpatrick was a professional man of information
and experience, and his partner a laborious, uninformed man. They
were unequal in this respect, and it is not surprising that such mistakes as might occur in the case would most probably be against
Farris. This may account for the very great difference in the
result when their complicated accounts were placed in the hands of
competent men for adjustment.
We think justice has been done by the Chancellor, and affirm his
decree making the injunction perpetual, and vesting the title to the
mill tract in Farris.

POLK AND OTHERS vs. FANCHER AND OTHERS.
WILSON POLK AND OTHERS, VS. THOS. H. FANCHER. AND OTHERS.
1. Where a negro slave, confined in jail on the charge of rape and murder, was
taken by the defendants, acting in concert with a mob, from the sheriff's
custody and hanged, it is such a deliberate, premeditated and violent destraction of the plaintiff' s property, as to entitle him to vindictive damages.
2. It is not permitted to prove, in such case, in order to diminish the pecuniary
value of the slave, that lie was apprehended for rape and murder; was infamous, and therefore of no value.
CARUTHERS, J.-Tbis was an action on the case with one count
in trover, and another in case, brought against the defendants in
*hite Circuit Court, to recover damages for killing their negro man
slave, Austin. The verdict and judgment were in favor of the
plaintiffs for one cent damages, and they1 bring up the case by appeal in error.
The Court permitted the defendants to prove the character of the
slave to be bad, and to give their opinions that he was of no value
on account of his infamy. .Maost of them stated that they had never
seen or known him until he was apprehended for rape and murder,
and put into the jail at Sparta, and in view of that charge hanging
over him, they considered him worth nothing. Objections to all
this evidence were overruled, and it was permitted to go to the
jury. This, we think, was clearly erroneous. It is easy to see in
a case like this what a powerful effect such proof would have upon
the minds of a jury.
The case was one of extraordinary aggravation, in which all law
was set at defiance, public justice insulted, and the life of a human
being, already in manacles, lawlessly destroyed. He was charged
with the shocking crimes of rape and murder combined. But the
officers of justice had performed their duty, and had him safely
incarcerated in jail to await the vengeance of the law, in case the
guilt was established according to its forms There was not the
least necessity that the defendants should interfere after the criminal had been secured and disarmed of all power of resistance or of
flight, and shed human blood, even of a slave, without trial or condemnation. If the slave were guilty of the crimes imputed, no
punishment would be too severe for him, and so by the law the
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penalty is death-death by hanging-the mode adopted by the defendants without and against law. But no man, whether bond or
free, is to be condemned without a hearing-a fair and impartial
trial. There is neither valor nor patriotism in deeds like these.
Not valor, because there is no contest, the victim is already in bonds
and harmless; nor patriotism, because the country has provided for
the proper and legal punishment of offenders, and needs not the aid
of mobs and lawless combinations to wield the sword of justice or
quicken its stroke. No matter how great the malefactor may be,
whose life is thus taken, without law, a feeling of alarm and insecurity pervades the whole community, when one of these shocking
deeds of violence is perpetrated. No man can tell what unfortunate
concurrence of circumstances may raise the storm of popular fury
against him, though he may be innocent, and bring speedy destruction upon him, if these examples are to be tolerated. All good
citizens, every one who values his own safety, or has any regard for
law and order, should unite in rebuking, in all proper modes, these
outrages upon the lives of men, and obstructions of the course of
law and justice. The courts and juries, public officers and citizens,
should set their faces like flint against popular outbreaks and mobs
in all their forms. The security of life and property imperiously
demand this course in a country where the protection of rights is
dependent upon the law, and not upon artillery and bayonets, as in
despotic governments. There is no safety in a free government but
in a strict observance and rigid enforcement of law. It is the only
protection of the weak against the strong, or the few against the
many. This slave was well secured in jail to abide his trial, and
answer the demands of justice against him, even with his life.
There was no chance for escape.
Some of the defendants, by written agreement to stand by each
other, and others without having signed it, moved by concert to the
jail, broke down the door, took out the negro, and hung him till he
was dead. It may be that he was guilty, but that was no good reason
why others should bring the blood of murder upon themselves by
taking life without authority of law, and in contempt of public justice. If he were guilty of the enormous crimes charged against
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him, it was not then made manifest by a trial, and his guilt had not
been established. The presumption of innocence can only be removed by proof upon a legal trial. It must be taken, then, for the
purposes of this suit that no crime had been committed by the
victim of this wanton outrage. The jury should have been so instructed, and no proof of character based upon this charge should
have been admitted. This would involve the necessity of trying
the truth of all such charges to ascertain what weight should be
given to the opinion. It is easy to see that this mode of ascertaining damages from the value of the slave based upon character, with
reference to the truth of the charge, would always make a case of
nominal damages in cases of this kind. Witnesses would readily
say, that as the slave was guilty of murder, and confined in jail to
be hung for it, he was of no value. That is not the rule in such a
case. His value should be determined from age, appearance, health,
and with all these, what he would sell for in the market, not what
A, B or C would give for him, or what he was worth if the charge
were true. They recklessly slew him, and his guilt can never be
legally made out. This misguided zeal to avenge the wrongs of
others has deprived society of an example to deter evil men from
crime, and presented an example of all others the most alarming to
any well-ordered community. The general moral traits of character,
as well as physical condition, would constitute elements in the estimation of value, but without reference to the accusation upon which
he had not been tried, and as to which the law presumed his innocence, until the contrary was made legally to appear. It was not
for the defendants to adjudge that question, nor for witnesses to form
and give their opinions as to his value upon the supposition of his
guilt.
We think his honor also erred in holding that this was not a case
in which the jury might go beyond the actual value, and give exemplary and vindictive damages. It was a deliberate, premeditated
and violent destruction of the plaintiff's property, in disregard of
both the civil and criminal laws of the State, and of most evil example. It is just the kind of case in which the jury ought to have
been allowed to vindicate the law by going beyond this value, and
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giving exemplary damages. In the case of Johnson vs. Perry, 2
Hump., 579, where the action was like this for injury to a slave, the
court say: "the jury may give smart money as a punishment for
aggravated circumstances attending the wrong."
In Tillotson vs. Cheatham, 3 J. R., 46-64, which was an action
for beating a horse to death, it was held that as it was a case of
"wantonness and cruelty, the jury had a right to give smart money."
This was the charge of the Circuit Judge, and the Supreme Court
said it was correct, and that they would have been better satisfied
with the verdict if it had been more exemplary. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut, 10 Conn., 884, hold that for injuries to personal property "the jury is not restricted to the pecuniary loss of
the plaintiff."
These cases and many others are cited in Sedgwick on Dam. 454,
464. The reason of this rule is, that, in aggravated cases, the
damages should be such as not only to remunerate or compensate
the plaintiff, but to operate as a punishment of defendant, and an
example to deter others from like offences. This principle is every
where regarded as one of most salutary influence in the administration of justice, tending to prevent wrongs by the double operation of punishment and example.
The plaintiffs proved their title to this slave, and that he was killed
by the defendants, and should have recovered his market value at
least. This verdict was a mockery of justice.
The judgment will be reversed, and a new trial granted.

BEN3AMIN

BARNES

vs. ANDREW GREGORY.

1. The power of the Court of Equity to reform deeds in cases of fraud, is constantly exercised, and cannot now be questioned.
2. Where the proof leaves no doubt that the sale of land was by the acre, and not
in gross, and was so understood by both parties, and the vendee receives more
land than he pays for, the vendor can compel payment for the whole quantity

sold.
CARUTHERS, J.-The complainant sold to the defendant a small
tract of land on Stone's river, in Davidson county. The deed gives
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a description of the land, and states that it contains "thirty acres,

more or less," and the consideration $1,000.
This bill is filed to correct a mistake as to the quantity of land
to the extent of fifteen acres, and claiming $35 per acre for the
same. It is charged that the sale was by the acre, and the quantity to be ascertained by a survey ; that before the execution of the
deed the survey was made by one Hamilton, and the quantity ascertained, and concealed from him, and his deed obtained, and notes
executed for thirty acres instead of the true quantity of forty-five
acres.
The defendant denies that the sale was by the acre, but insists
that it was in gross; that he was to give $1,050 for the tract; that
he was by the contract to have it, as containing thirty acres, whether it were more or less than the quantity. He relies upon his
deed as written evidence of the contract, which cannot be changed
by parol.
The proof leaves no doubt upon the mind, as to the contract having been a sale by the acre, and not in gross. It is clearly established that it was so understood by both parties, both by their
actions and declarations, though the defendant sometimes denied
it. The fact that a survey was to be made before the execution of
the last note, for the consideration and the deed, is almost conclusive of that fact. It is entirely so, when combined with the declarations of both parties at, before and after that time.
The testimony also raises as strong presumption, that the defendant knew of the excess before the writings were drawn and signed,
and concealed it from complainant. The facts are, the survey was
made by Hamilton on the day agreed upon, but the calculation was
not made on that day, but was to be made out that night, and on the
next day the parties were to meet at the house of complainant, and
execute the writings, the contract still resting in parol. The surveyor and the defendant went and staid together at the house of a
neighbor, and returned next day, about dinner time, with the deed
and notes, and being in a great hurry, procured it to be signed by
the complainant, delivered his notes, and went off. At the time of
signing the deed, complainant inquired whether the survey made
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out more or less than thirty acres, and referred to the contract,
that whether more or less, the price agreed upon was $35 per acre.
The defendant asserted that he did not know how much there was,
but he was to pay $1,050 for the tract, or $35 per acre for thirty
acres, without regard to the actual number. So, after a short conversation, he went off in haste, having, as he said, urgent business
of an official character to attend to at home, carrying the dedd with
him. It is impossible for the mind to doubt from these facts, that
he and Hamilton had made a calculation upon the filled notes that
night, at least so far as to be convinced that the tract exceeded
thirty acres, and that this fact was purposely concealed from the
complainant. It appears that the complainant was weak and sickly,
and about sixty years of age. It may be, that Gregory said what
was literally true, when he asserted that he had not made an accurate calculation of the quantity, and that he did not know the exact
quantity. But that he did know there were more than thirty acres,
there can be no question. He should have stated this fact to complainant, and not suppressed it, when inquired of on that point, and
more especially as he was with the surveyor acting for both parties.
But still it is contended that the deed must be taken as containing the true and full contract, and that no parol testimony can be
heard to change or reform it.
That such is the general rule both at law and equity, no one will
be heard to question. But it is just as unquestionable that this may
be done where clear proof is made of fraud, or mistake. Both positions are too familiar to permit a reference to authorities.
The power of a Court of Equity to reform deeds in case of fraud
or mistake was exercised by this court in Williams vs. Conrad, 11
Humph., 415; 8 Humph., 230, and 1 Id., 433. The authorities
are all collected in White and Tudor's Lead. Ca. Yol. 2, pt. 1, 558
to 596.
But in this case perhaps it is unnecessary to resort to the doctrine
of reforming deeds, by the proof of mistake or fraud. The deed
perhaps gives the boundaries correctly according to the survey, and
needs no change, but the statement of the quantity of land contained in those limits is inaccurate, and so is the amount of the
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consideration. That the consideration stated in a deed is only
primafacie,and may be controverted by parol, has been often held.
This deed is silent as to the disputed question, whether the sale was
by the acre or in gross. To establish the former, and obtain pay
for the whole quantity sold is the object of the bill. This fact may
be made out by parol or extrinsic written evidence. At the last
term in Knoxville, in the case of Bently vs. Miller and Wife, not
yet reported, we gave relief to the purchaser, Bently, upon the
ground that the sale was by the acre, as proved by extrinsic evidence,
where the deed was like the present, because of a deficiency of acres.
Such is the uniform course of decision, where there is a substantial
deficiency, and the contract by the acre, or even in gross when
there is fraud or imposition. Not so where the contract is fair, and
the sale is by the tract upon the judgment of the parties. The
same rule must apply under the same circumstances, in favor of the
vendor where there is an excess for which by mistake or fraud, he
received no compensation, or has been dep 'ived of the benefit of his
contract of sale by the acre. Horn vs. Denton, 2 Sneed, 125.
The complainant, then, is entitled to relief upon the grounds of
his actual contract, the mistake in the settlement, carried into the
writings executed, and for the fraud of the defendant.
The decree of the Chancellor will be affirmed with costs, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings upon his decree, which is in
all things correct.
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In the .Exclzequer .Chamber, February, 1859.
PAUL vs. JOEL.
In an action by the endorsee against the drawer of a bill of exchange on B, the
following writing was held to be a sufficient notice of dishonor:-" B's acceptance to J," (the defendant,) "for 5001., due on the 12th January, is unpaid.
Payment to R. & Co. is required before four o'clock."

This was an appeal from the decision of the Court of Exchequer.
The facts of the case and the arguments in the court below are fully
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reported 4 Jar., N. S., 1086, nom. Paul vs. Jewell. The plaintiff
sued, as public officer of a provincial banking company, against the
defendant as drawer of a bill of exchange, which had been endorsed
to the company. At the trial, the manager of the London office of
the company deposed, that on the day after the bill became due he
took it to the defendant's office, and asked a clerk there if the defendant was within; the clerk replied that the defendant was within, and asked the witness his name and business. The witness
replied that he should write down his business, and wrote on paper
the words-"Bosworth's acceptance to Joel for 5001., due on the
12th January, is unpaid. Payment to Robarts & Co. is required
before four o'clock." The witness gave this paper to the clerk, who
said he would take it to the defendant, and went away with it;
shortly afterwards returning, and delivered for answer, "it should
be attended to," but did not expressly state that he had seen the
defendant. It being objecte.d that this paper was not a sufficient
notice of dishonor, the learned judge left the case to the jury, who
found for the plaintiff, leave being reserved to move to enter a verdict for the defendant. A rule having been obtained, cause was
shown on the 27th May, 185S, against it, and the Court of Exchequer ultimately discharged the rule; and it was against this
decision that the appeal was brought.
Hannen, for the defendant below.-The question is, whether this
notice of dishonor is good within the decision of Solarte vs. Palmer,
(2 Cl. & Fin. 73.) That case is to be followed, being a decision of
the House of Lords; any case falling within its principle must be
governed by it until it is reversed by Parliament. Lord Campbell,
C. J., in .Everhard vs. Watson, (1 El. & B1. 801,) has, indeed,
remarked that Solarte vs. Palmer had caused much confusion; but
the principle of it was, that the notice of dishonor must, by necessary implication, convey to the party that the bill had been dishonored-i. e. had been not only not paid, but presented for payment, and not paid. Here there is nothing to lead to the inference
that it had been presented, beyond the mere fact of the notice itself
having been given. If the party had neglected to present the bill,
this is the notice he would have given. [Byles, J.--ailey vs.
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Porter, (14 M. & W. 44,) is exactly this case, is it not?] There
must be a presentment shown. (Strange vs. Price, 10 Ad. & El.
125.) In all the cases collected in Byles on Bills, 236, 7th ed.,
except Bailey vs. Porter,there were found the same words expressing that the bill had been dishonored or returned, and those words
are not in this notice. In Bailey vs. Porter the holder of the bill
was a banker, at whose house the bill had been made payable; all
was done that could be done, and no presentment was necessary to
be proved. [Crompton, J.-The notice in Solarte vs. Palmer was
a notice of action, in fact; and it seems now to be established that
the Courts are not to be bound by it, except in circumstances
exactly similar.] [He cited Furze vs. Sharwood, (2 Q. B. 388,)
and Allen vs. -dmundson, (2 Exch. 719.)] [Crompton, J.-I
much prefer the decision in Bailey vs. Porterto that of .Furze vs.
Sharwood. Crowder, J.-In Redger vs. Steavenson, (2 M. & W.
799,) Parke, B., said he was not prepared to be bound by all the
reasons given in the House of Lords for the decision in Solarte vs.
Palmer. Byles, J.-But for Solarte vs. Palmer and Hartley vs.
Case, (4 B. & Cr. 339,) there would not be a doubt about the
matter.]
Archibald, for the plaintiff below, was not called on.
WIGHTMAN, J.-We are all of opinion that the judgment of the
Court of Exchequer must be affirmed. Solarte vs. Palmer, which
was the great case relied on by the defendant's counsel, is clearly
distinguishable, because there was no communication of the dishonor
there; there was simply a demand of payment; and it was mainly
on that ground that the decision of the House of Lords turned. In
many cases Solarte vs. Palmer has been commented on. But
where, as in Hedger vs. Steavenson, in the terms used there is no
doubt that by reasonable intendment it is to be inferred that the
bill has not been paid, though in express terms it does not appear
that the bill had been presented and dishonored, that is sufficient.
That is one decision. Another is Bailey vs. Porter, where the
defendant was informed that the bill was unpaid. That was held
to be sufficient. Here the notice is, " Bosworth's acceptance to Joel
for 5001., due on the 12th January, is unpaid. Payment to Robarts
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& Co. is required before four o'clock." That agrees with the cases
I have mentioned, and Bailey vs. Porter has been referred to on
many occasions as an authority, and we think it governs this case.
Judgment affirmed.

In the Court of Exchequer, June, 1859.
GOODWYN vs. CHAVELEY.
Plaintiff's men were driving thirty-six oxen along the road between five and six
o'clock of an evening in November; twenty-three escaped into a field of defendant's adjoining the road, through gaps in his fence. The men drove on the
remaining thirteen to the nearest obtainable place of safety for the night, and
returned (having been absent about an hour) for the other twenty-three left in
defendant's field. Defendant had then impounded them, for which the plaintiff
brought this action.

The learned judge at the trial directed the jury that, under

the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff's men had not removed, or tried to
remove, the cattle within a reasonable time, and directed a verdict for the defendant:

.Held, (Bramwell, B dissentiente,) to be a misdirection; that it was not a question of law for the opinion of the judge, but a question of fact upon the evidence
given, that should be determined by the jury, and consequently there must be a
new trial.

This was an action against the defendant for impounding the
plaintiff's cattle. Defendant pleaded that he took them damage
feasant in his close. Plaintiff replied that his cattle were lawfully
going along a road, when other cattle were being driven along the
road; that plaintiff's cattle escaped into defendant's close, and that
plaintiff within reasonable time removed them, but that defendant
had impounded them before reasonable time had elapsed for plaintiff
to remove them. Defendant joined issue thereon.
The plaintiff's man, assisted by another person, was driving
thirty-six oxen along the highway about half-past five o'clock at
night in the month of November; some twenty-three escaped into
the defendant's field through the gaps in his fences adjoining the
road; thirteen remained outside in the road. The man drove on
the thirteen to the nearest place he could find for them, and there
lodged them for the night. He then immediately returned for the
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others in defendant's field, but found the defendant had impounded
them. The men were absent from the twenty-three in defendant's
field about an hour. The cause was tried before Bramwell, B., in
Essex, who directed the jury that the plaintiff's men had not, under
the circumstances, removed the cattle, or tried to remove them,
within a reasonable time, and therefore defendant had not impounded
them before a reasonable time had elapsed for their being removed,
and directed a verdict for defendant. A rule nisi having been obtained for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection,
.Hawkins, Q. Q. and Turner showed cause.
Honyman, contra, in support of the rule.
The following authorities were cited :-Ramehum ullich vs.
Luclhmeechund Badakizen, 9 Moore P. 0. C., 46; Taylor on Evid.
sect. 81; Tennant vs. Bell, 9 Q. B., 684; -Huntervs. Caldwell,
10 Q. B., 69; Attwood vs. Emery, 1 0. B., N. S., 110; Phillips
vs. Irving, 1 M. & G., 325; Burton vs. Griffiths, 11 M. & W. 817 ;
Temple vs. Pullen, 8 Ex., 389. Cur. adv. vult.
June 14.-BRAMwELL, B.-This case was tried before me, and
unhappily we are not all agreed. I have the misfortune to be alone
in the opinion I entertain-an opinion which I expressed at the
trial, and, unfortunately, abide by, and which I must now express.
But, in order to make the judgment I have to deliver more intelligible, I will shortly state what the question was. The plaintiff
complained of a trespass, that his cattle had been taken and impounded; the defendant pleaded that he took them damage feasant
in his close. The plaintiff replied that the cattle were lawfully
going or being driven along a road, and at the same time some other
cattle were being driven along the road; that they escaped into the
defendant's close, and that he'the plaintiff, within a reasonable time,
removed them, but the defendant impounded them before a reasonable time had elapsed for him the plaintiff to remove them. Upon
that the defendant took issue, and the question at the trial was,
whether the defendant impounded these cattle and removed them
from his close before a reasonable time for the plaintiff to remove
them had elapsed. Upon the trial it appeared that the plaintiff's
men were driving upwards of twenty-two oxen along the road-
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twenty-three or twenty-two, it is not material. The plaintiff's man
was assisted by another drover; it was night, and there were gaps
in the fences of defendant's field, who was not shown to be under
any obligation to fence; through these gaps the cattle in question
escaped into the defendant's field. All the cattle did not escape;
seven or eight escaped into the defendant's close, the rest, the
larger portion, remained in the road. The plaintiff's men, thinking it better to leave the cattle where they were in the defendant's
field in safety, drove the -others on, instead of leaving them in the
road unprotected, to a place of safety, the nearesff they could find,
and there lodged and housed them for the night, and with all convenient speed came back to the defendant's close. When they
arrived there, the cattle which had strayed into the defendant's
close had been taken and impounded. It ought to be added that
the plaintiff's witness very truly considered this; he said, " There
was nothing to prevent me driving the cattle off the close before
their getting into it, except that I preferred taking care of those
which had not escaped into the close. I could have got them out
sooner than I did." It was not necessary to say what time elapsed.
I think it was about an hour between the time when the cattle got
first into the close, and when the plaintiff's men were enabled to
come back and take them away. It is not necessary to mention
that, or to be particular as to the time, because it was admitted by
the plaintiff's men, that they could have turned and got the cattle
off the defendant's close before they were taken and impounded, had
they thought fit, but they did not think fit, because they preferred
to take care of the cattle whieh had not so escaped into the close.
Now, upon that I ruled that the plaintiff's men had confessed, and
their statement was not controverted by the plaintiff-it was
assumed they were telling the truth-I ruled, that being taken to
be so, it appeared upon the plaintiff's .case, and it was admitted by
him, that the plaintiff's men had not removed the cattle, or tried to
remove them within a reasonable time, and consequently that the
defendant had not impounded them before a reasonable time for
their being removed had elapsed. Now upon that ruling of mine,
accordingly I directed a verdict for the defendant, and my ruling
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was questioned by a motion in this court for a new trial for misdirection. I propose to show why I think that ruling was correct.
Now some confusion arose, as always does it seems arise in questions of this description, as to how far it is one of law or one of
fact, how far it is open to a judge to determine it. I do not believe
there is much difference upon the matter. I am of opinion that all
these cases raise two questions: first, what is the rule of law to
determine what is or is not reasonable; next, what are the facts to
show whether they are brought with the rule. I do not know that
one can instance it better than by the case so often mentioned in
the course of the argument. A man gives an order for a coat to a
tailor ; the coat is brought home at the end of six months ; the person who has ordered it refuses to take it, upon which an action is
brought; the question is, whether the coat is tendered within a
reasonable time. We will suppose the plaintiff to admit that the
ordinary time within which a coat is made and delivered is a week
or ten days, or something of that sort, at all events six months is a
great deal longer than the ordinary time. In a case of that kind
I am clearly of opinion that the judge may direct a verdict for the
defendant. He may say, "The law is, a man is bound in a case
of this description to deliver the article or tender it within a reasonable time, and that, reasonable time, in the absence of anything
to control a particular engagement, is the ordinary time. I tell
you, that being the law, the facts being admitted by the plaintiff
that he did not do it within that time, you must find your verdict
for the defendant." So here it seems to me, if I was right in holding, as I did hold, and as I think still, that a reasonable time
to do it is a reasonable time for the act itself, without reference
to extrinsic circumstances-inasmuch as if a man admitted be
could have done it within such a time as that, but had taken
a longer time because extrinsic circumstances made it desirable
he should do so-it appears tome, if I was right in holding that
proposition of law, that I was right in directing a verdict for the
defendant. Of course I can perfectly well understand that there
are cases in which a question of this description must be left to the
jury. Suppose for instance, I put again the case of the coat; sup-
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pose one set of witnesses say the usual time within which to deliver
it is a week, and others say the usual time is a month, all the judge
can say is, " Gentlemen, I rule it must be done within a reasonable time; it is for you to determine what that is." But it seems
to me, where the facts are admitted, and being admitted that the
time exceeds that which by law is a reasonable time, it seems that
the judge is not only warranted, but is bound, to direct that -a reasonable time has been exceeded, and direct a verdict for the party
who makes that contention ; just in the same way as he would- be
bound equally to direct a verdict for the plaintiff or the defendant
in the case where the coat had been tendered in the ordinary time.
So much for the first part of the discussion, as to which there was,
and always will be, some confusion, I suppose, owing to the matter
not being discriminated in the way in which it ought to have been.
But now the remaining question is, whether I was right in holding
that a reasonable time within which to do this was a reasonable
time to do the act itself, without reference to extrinsic circum.stances. I think it was. I think I was right, and I proceed to
say why. The plaintiff had no right to have his cattle trespass on
the defendant's land. The law is this; he has a right to take his
cattle along the highway; and certainly if they do go along the
highway and there are no fences in the adjoining land, it is certain
that they will stray; therefore the plaintiff cannot prevent it, and
as that is a necessary consequence of the enjoyment of the right of
using the highway, why it is a necessary evil, I suppose, which those
whose lands border on the highway must sustain; but that being
the reason of the rule, it extends as far as reason points out, and
no farther; and, consequently, what you may call the right of the
plaintiff, or his immunity from the consequence, extends no further
than there is necessity for it. I own, I think that is pretty tolerably plain reasoning, and inasmuch as there was no necessity
for these cattle stopping longer in the place than was necessary
actually to turn them off, it seems to me manifest that they stopped
there an unreasonable time, and, consequently, the defendant did
not distrain them before a reasonable time for their removal had
elapsed. It seems to me that the fallacy-which I have my Lord
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Wensleydale's authority for saying is not a discourteous term to
apply to those who differ from you-the fallacy of the argument
on the other side is in considering this a case of reasonableness with
reference to the situation of the plaintiff, if we may say so. I
readily admit, if it bad been the plaintiff's fault that the cattle haa
strayed, and that he had complained of his men for leaving them
there, instead of at once turning them off, and saying, "Your
behavior was not reasonable behavior," as his servants, they would
have a very excellent answer, because they would have been at
liberty to say, "1It was the best thing we could do." The question is, not what was the best thing they could do for him, but what
was the best thing they could do for the defendant, whose cattle
had trespassed. In like way it may be, for any thing I know, that
the public would rejoice and compliment these two drovers for
leaving the cattle safely browsing upon the defendant's pastures,
and taking the others to a place of safety, rather than leave them
unprotected in the road, to wander about, and possibly do mischief. But it is the defendant's case to be considered, and not that
of the public. I admit, if the question were, whether the drovers
should be punished for what they have done, I say they ought not
to be punished. But I say again, what are the defendant's rights
in the matter ? His right is to have his land trespassed on as
little as. posssible, to no greater extent than is absolutely necessary.
I therefore think a reasonable time was such, and no more than was
required for the act itself. The case was argued as though there
had been some desperate hardship upon the plaintiff in this way of
dealing with it; but there is none. His cattle are distrained and
impounded. What then ? He must get them out. What is the
situation of the defendant ? "How long are they to browse upon
his land? He cannot maintain any action. If he can maintain
any action for the trespass in coming on to his land, it isadmitted
he would not be right in not proceeding to it. According to the
argument that on the part of the plaintiff, rather than he should
have the inconvenience of getting the cattle out of the pound, the
defendant is to undergo the inconvenience of having his crops,
whatever they may be-corn or any thing else-grazed upon until
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the plaintiff could get a convenient and comfortable time to remove
them; and for aught I can see, the same argument might go on to
this extent, that they might continue in the plaintiff's field for
twenty-four hours, because the men could not sooner have housed
the remaining cattle. Suppose they were driving them and some
of the cattle had been seized with a vagary and had gone into some
other field; and suppose the question had been whether they might
not have collected them and got them into a place of safety; if the
question is which of these two parties ought to bear the loss, why
should it not be the plaintiff? The plaintiff's cattle had no right
in the defendant's field. If the question is whether the defendant's
herbage and crops are to be grazed and browsed upon without any
compensation till it is convenient for the drovers to come back and
take them away; or on the other hand, the plaintiff is to be at the
inconvenience of getting his cattle out of the pound, it seems to
me this very consideration points to the plaintiff bearing the loss
rather than the defendant. One of them must do it. I think,
therefore, that the plaintiff's duty was to see that, so far as he may
have had a right or an immunity from the consequences of the trespass in consequence of the cattle going into the defendant's land,
it was a right and an immunity to the extent to which it was necessary, and no more. Then it was not necessary, because there was
no physical impossibility that they should not be at once driven off.
and if either party is to bear the loss, it seems to me it should be
on the part of the plaintiff. One may put by the way another
argument, which had escaped me, for the purpose of showing the
hardship upon the defendant, the very circumstances of this case;
he comes to his field, and he finds cattle quietly grazing there; there
is no duty in anybody to leave them there, because, it was contended, the duty was to drive the rest of the herd on ; there is no
notice by- the plaintiff when they would be taken away, or anything
to indicate that he may or may not impound them. How long is
he to remain? What is he to do? Is he to make inquiries of
any one, and say, "Have you seen two careful drovers driving the
rest of the herd along the road with the appearance of an animus
revertendi to come and take them away? because, if so, I cannot
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impound them." What is he to do? He can do nothing but impound them. For these reasons I think I was right to rule as I
did. I thought it a clear case then, and I own, as a matter of
reasoning, I think it a clear case now. I am sorry for it, because
I probably am in the wrong, and, if so, I am very much in the
wrong. I cannot change my opinion, and I am bound to express
it in the way in which I have done.
MARTI,, B.-My opinion is, this point is essentially a question
for the jury, and not a question of law, in my judgment, at all. It
is said that the defendant in this case was not to blame. I do not
say he is to blame. I am not aware that he could be indicted for
not fencing his field from the road, which most people in this country do; they put fences between their fields and the road. If a
man will not do that, it seems to me he must put up with some of
the inconveniences consequent upon it. Now one of the inconveniences is, that cattle being driven upon the road will stray. But
the facts of this case were these-that a man was driving tweritythree bullocks at nightfall in the month of November, and as he was
driving them along, two or three of these bullocks went into a field,
there being no fence to protect the road from the defendant's field;
and that thereupon the man who was driving them, drove the remainder of the cattle-nineteen or twenty head of cattle-to some
place, where they were secured, and immediately came back to
bring the cattle out of the plaintiff's field. It seems to me that
that man did all he reasonably could be required to do. He was
under no obligation to leave the rest of his master's cattle to stray
at nightfall upon the road, for the purpose of relieving the defendant from injury from the plaintiff's cattle, which had got into his
field. In my judgment the inain cause of this was, the man not
doing what was ordinarily done, to have a fence to keep them offi
It seems a right question for the jury, and not a question upon
which a judge could take upon himself-to direct absolutely a verdict
one way or the other. The jury have found the man did not remove them as soon as he reasonably might have done. As I understand, they adopted that view, and I am inclined to adopt that
view. That man had done all he possibly could do; there was no
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obligation upon him to permit the other man's cattle to stray, and
possibly be lost, for the purpose of relieving this man from the consequence of not having a fence between the field and the road. All
I say is, it was a question for the jury, and I should not have been
satisfied if they had found a verdict for the plaintiff at all, if the
plaintiff was the man who brought the action for the trespass, and
if they had found against the owner of the field.
POLLOCK, C. B.-I have also the misfortune to differ from my
brother Bramwell. I think the rule for a new trial, which was
founded on a misdirection of my brother Bramwell, ought to be
made absolute. My brother Bramwell's direction is in substance
this; that if more time was taken to remove the cattle than was
reasonably necessary for that purpose, and that purpose only, and
then the cattle were not removed within a reasonable time, that the
defendant had a right to distrain them without reference to any
.other extrinsic circumstances whatever. I think that is not the law.
I think it cannot be the law in any country where reason and good
sense prevail. It certainly is not the law according to any authority that was cited. And then the question is, if a man who has
land adjoining a highway will not do as persons who have any valuable crop growing upon it usually do, by fencing guard the land
from the encroachment of cattle going along the highway; the
-question is whether he is entitled to require that the drovers (and I
must .assume that there were on this occasion the proper and reasonable number required for the cattle on the road,)-whether the
owner of the land adjoining the road has a right to say, "You shall
remove the cattle from my land, on which they have strayed," without reference to any other consideration upon the whole earth; if
one of the cattle remaining on the road has trodden upon one of the
persons who are there; or if some circumstance occurred that required the sheriff instantly to say, "I call on you, in the King's
name, to assist to arrest a felon in the field," or "I call on you to
prevent a breach of the peace ;" or if circumstances occurred by
which if a man does not give his attention for a few minutes to a
person in great peril of life-all these circumstances, it is suggested,
are to have no weight whatever-the owner of the cattle has, appa-
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rently, a right to the instant attention of the drovers, to neglect
everything else, every other duty, even a public duty which they
may be called on to perform, and clear his field of the cattle, from
which he might entirely have excluded them if he had taken the
ordinary means people do of fencing their land from the public
highway. I think the owner of land adjoining a highway, upon
-whose property cattle have strayed, has a right to have the cattle
removed within a reasonable time, with reference to all the circumstances that may belong to the transaction at the time of its occurrence, that he has no other or greater right than that, and inasmuch
as cattle upon the highway require to be directed and care to be taken
with reference both to the public and with reference to the cattle
themselves, and especially during the night-it appears to me that
if, for instance, the cattle can be taken to a place of safety within
a few minutes, and then the drovers may return and with perfect
safety to all the cattle, drive off those which have strayed, I think
that is a circumstance that may fairly be presented to the jury, If
the cattle cannot be put in a place of safety for many hours, it may
be a matter to be submitted to the jury to say that they ought then
to have run the risk, and to have removed the cattle more immediately. It appears to me that the jury, with all the circumstances
before them, have had the question put to them whether the cattle
have been removed within a reasonable time with reference to the
circumstances of the particular case. I think, therefore, the direction was wrong, and that the rule for a new trial ought to be made
absolute. My brother Ohannell is of the same opinion.-Rule
absolutefor a new trial.

In the Court of Queen's Bench, February 1859.
THE LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY vs. GLYN.
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named, and the insurers were "liable to pay, reinstate, or make good, at their
option, to the said assured, all damage or loss which the said assured shall suffer
by fire on the property herein particularized, not exceeding on each item the sum
hereinbefore declared to be insured :"
Held, that the policy extended to cover the whole value of any goods sent to
plaintiffs to be carried, and not merely the plaintiffs' interest as carriers:
Held, further, that plaintiffs could recover the value of a package of silk
destroyed on the said premises, by fire, although it had not been declared as
required by the Carriers' Act, and therefore they would not be liable as carriers
for its loss.

Declaration by the plaintiffs against the defendant, as treasurer
of the Globe Insurance Company, on a policy of insurance against
loss and damage by fire, dated the 11th December 1854, by which
the sum of £15,000 was insured on goods (the plaintiffs' own) and
in trust as carriers in a certain warehouse, which bad been burnt
and destroyed by fire, whereby the plaintiffs sustained a loss on
the said goods, which they held in trust as carriers, to the amount
of £15,000.
Plea (inter alia,) that the plaintiffs did not, by reason of the said
burning and destroying by fire, suffer damage or loss upon the said
goods.
At the trial before Willes, J., at the Surrey summer assizes 1858,
a verdict was entered for the plaintiffs for the amount claimed, subject to the opinion of the court on the following case:By the policy of insurance upon which this action is brought, an
insurance was on the 11th December 1854, effected by the plaintiffs with the Globe Insurance Company for the sum of £25,000,
£10,000 of which was declared to be on a warehouse belonging to
the plaintiffs, occupied by Messrs. Pickford, situate at the Camden
Town station of the London and Northwestern Railway, and
£15,000 "1on goods, their (the plaintiffs') own, and in trust as
carriers therein." And it was declared that during the continuance of the policy "the capital stock or fund of the Insurance
Company shall be subject and liable to pay, reinstate, or make
good, at their option, to the said assured, all damage or loss which
the said assured shall suffer by fire, on the property herbin particularized, not exceeding on each item the sum hereinbefore declared
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to be insured ;" with a proviso that the policy should be subject to
the conditions at the back thereof. By the second of the conditions so endorsed, it was provided, " Goods held in trust or on commission are to be insured as such, otherwise the policy will not 4xtend to cover such property." And by the twelfth condition, "In
every case of loss, duly proved, the Insurance Company will reinstate the property, or the assured shall receive satisfaction to the
amount thereof, without discount or deduction." The policy being
still in force on the 9th June 1857, the warehouse and nearly all
the goods then contained in it were consumed and wholly destroyed
by fire. All claims upon the policy have been settled and adjusted,
except those in respect of the 415,000 insured on goods their own
and in trust as carriers, in the warehouse as above mentioned. At
the time of the happening of the fire the warehouse contained a
large quantity of goods, which for the purposes of this case are to
be taken to be goods of the plaintiffs in trust as carriers, within the
meaning of the policy. These goods were -wholly destroyed by
the fire. The plaintiffs seek to recover, in this action, the value of
the last mentioned goods. It has been agreed that the rights and
liabilities of the plaintiffs and the Globe Insurance Company shall
be raised and determined upon selected items of the said goods, and
that the claims of the plaintiffs against the Globe Insurance Company in respect of the rest of the said goods shall be adjusted out of
court, on the principles which may be applied by the court to the
said items.
The plaintiffs were from a time prior to 1847, and have ever
since continued to be, common carriers of goods by railway, and as
such have during all that time carried goods over the London and
Northwestern Railway, among other places, from London to Edinburgh. The Camden Town station mentioned above is the terminal
goods station of the plaintiffs in London. On the 9th June 1857, a
package of silk of the value of £10, and upwards, was received in
London by Messrs. Pickford and Co., as agents for the plaintiffs, to
be carried by the plaintiffs from London to Edinburgh. These silks
were contained in one package, and the value and nature of such
silks were not at the time of the delivery thereof to Messrs. Pick-
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ford & Co., declared by the person sending or delivering the same,
nor was any increased charge or agreement to pay the same accepted by the person receiving such package. This parcel was
deposited by Messrs. Pickford & Co. in the warehouse, preparatory
to its being dispatched to its destination, and remained there until
it was burnt and destroyed by the fire. Messrs. Pickford & Co.,
after the fire and before this action, with the authority and on: behalf
of the plaintiffs, paid to the consignee of the silks, part of the value
thereof, which was accepted by the latter in discharge of his claim
against the plaintiffs in respect of the said silks. The pleadings
and policy were to form part of the case.
The question for the opinion of the court was whether, having
regard to the provisions of the Carriers Act, 1 Will. 4, c. 68, the
plaintiffs were entiled to recover the value of the silks, or the
amount so paid in respect of them as aforesaid. If the court
should be of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover in
respect of the selected items, the verdict for the plaintiffs was to
stand, subject to the adjustment before mentioned, in accordance
with the principles laid down by the court.
Archibald for the plaintiffs.-The only question with which it
will be necessary to trouble the court is, whether there is any
defence to this action by reason of the provisions of the Carriers
Act. The defendants assert that inasmuch as the goods were not
"declared," and the plaintiffs therefore are not liable for their
loss, the plaintiffs have not sustained any loss beyond any pecuniary interest they might have in the goods, and that they are not
entitled to recover against defendants beyond that amount. The
nature of the contract of insurance was decided in the case of
Waters vs. Thie XMonarch Insurance Company, 5 E. & B. 870.
There the policy was very similar in its terms to the present one,
and that case may be taken as conclusive. Lord Campbell, C. J.,
in his judgment in that case says : "I cannot doubt the policy was
intended to protect such goods. . . I think a person entrustd
with goods can insure them without orders from the insurer, and
even without informing him that there is such a policy. It would
be most inconvenient if a wharfinger could not, at his own cost, keep
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up a floating policy for the benefit of all who may become his customers. The last point is, to what extent does the policy protect
those goods ? The defendant says, only the plaintiffs' personal
interest. But the policies are in terms to make good all such
damage and loss as may happen by fire to the property hereinbefore mentioned. That is a valid contract, and as the property is
wholly destroyed, the value of the whole must be made good; not
merely the particular interest of the plaintiffs. They will be entitled to apply so much as to cover their own interest, and will be
trustees for the owners as to the rest." And Crompton, J., said :
"The parties meant to insure those goods with which the plaintiffs
were entrusted, and in every part of which they had an interest,
both in respect of their lien and of their responsibility to their
bailors. What the surplus, after satisfying their own claim, might
be, could only be ascertained after the loss, when the amount of their
lien at that time was determined; but they were persons interested
in every part of the goods." [ERLE, J.-I quite concur, but nothing is there said about the plaintiffs' ability to recover from their
owners.
WIGHTMAN, J.-I
don't think that decision was limited;
I think it extended to all the goods. CROMPTON, J.-I
always
thought that carriers, warehousemen, and others, had floating policies to insure all the goods passing through their hands ; why should
the parties sending, and the carriers, both insure ? The judgment
referred to goes to the extent of the insurer's ability to recover for
the whole lien and property of persons entrusting property to them.
WIGHTMAN, J.-You may take it that this insurance is perfectly
legal.] Then the only question is the extent of the insurance, and
that is clearly to the whole value of the goods ; the object is to
insure the full amount for the benefit of the persons to whom the
goods belong. The plaintiffs would be liable both in equity and
common law to the owners for the balance recovered. Sideway8s
vs. Todd, 2 Stark. 400. [ERLE, J.-There is a case of doubtful
authority on the point (Allen vs. Irmpett, 8 Taunt. 263,) which was
in fact overruled by Roper vs. Holland, 3 A. & E. 99, which settled
the point; where there is a promise to pay, an action will lie, but a.
mere equitable claim is not sufficient.]
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If. Lloyd, contra.-The plaintiffs insured their own risk as carriers only, and can recover nothing further ; the insurance was
intended to cover their own loss, and not that of others. The
plaintiffs were not bound to pay anything to the owners of the silk;
they had a good defence under the Carriers Act, and therefore,
personally, they need not have suffered loss. The first question is,
who are the assured ? and, secondly, what loss, if any, hae they
sustained ? If the assured are the railway company for themselves,
and not beyond that as trustees for others, the damage is the
liability incurred, and not the sum voluntarily paid by them.
Waters vs. The Monarch Insurance Company is distinguishable
from this case; the terms of the two policies are not the same, and
Lord Oampbell, in his judgment in that case, particularly relies on
the terms of the insurance. A special interest may be insured by
general words, and yet the insured be entitled to recover only to
the amount of his special interest. Arnould on Insurance, 305,
306; Irving vs. Richardson, 2 B. &Ad. 193; Wolff vs. ilorneastle,
1 Bos. & Pul. 316 ; Crowley vs. Cohen, 3 B. & Ad. 478. [CROMPTON, J.-That last case is against you ; it shows that a carrier's
interest in goods may be insured under the general words "goods
and merchandise," and that the insertion of the words " as trustees" is unnecessary.] The words here are not " as trustees,"
but "in trust as carriers," which words were inserted to comply
with the second condition, which requires that the interest assured
shall be shown, but not to extend it for the benefit of the owners of
the trust property. [CROMPTON, J.-Your argument would be,
that there was no necessity to introduce special conditions as to
goods held as trustees or as carriers, because a common policy
would cover loss to them.] A trustee may insure the property of
his eestui que trust, but why should the plaintiffs insure any interest
but their own ? [OROMPoN, J.-To induce parties to entrust them
with property, knowing that it was insured.] That may be so with
warehousemen and wharfingers, but there is a distinction between
those trades and that of a carrier : these latter are generally by
law insurers themselves. The question turns upon the policy,
which must be regarded in connection with the surrounding circum.
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stances, which differ materially from those of Waters vs. The
Monarch Insurance Company. The plaintiffs only meant to insure
their own interest ; " in trust" is a mere description of property,
and not the extent of the interest insured. Why should a carrier
have an intention of protecting the property of those who are treating him unfairly, and defrauding him by not declaring the value of
the goods sent, and by thus avoiding the payment of extra carriage ? [HILL, J.-But are the plaintiffs so defrauded ? This is a
sort of floating policy, and it is an inducement to persons to send
their goods because they know they are insured.] Then it is a
temptation to the senders not to declare their more valuable goods.
[COoMPTON, J.-I see no fraud. We must look at the policy, and
it seems to me to protect the plaintiffs qud trustees.] Carruthersvs.
Sheddon, 6 Taunt. 15, was also cited.
WIGHTMAN, J.-The question raised in this case is, whether
the insured are entitled on this policy to recover compensation for
more than their own particular interest in these goods; in other words,
whether they are entitled to recover for their own particular interest
only in the goods, or for the whole value of the goods, including those
they held in trust as carriers. I think, according to the terms of this
policy, they were insured to the amount of the full value, and that the
insurance was not confined to their own interest. The terms of the
policy are not ambiguous; the insurance is stated to be upon goods belonging to the Company, and other goods in the warerooms held by
them in trust as carriers; and by the second condition it was necessary
for the insured to declare what goods they so held in trust for others,
and if they neglected to do so, as to such goods the insurance would be
void, intending, as it seems to me, to include all property held in
trust, as in the case of Waters vs. The Monarch Life Offiee, where
it was held that persons in the capacity of warehousemen could
recover on a policy of this nature, and that they held the amount
so recovered, subject to their own charges, in trust for the owners
of the goods. It is a voluntary trust, binding on them in a court
of equity; if that were not so there might be several insurances on
the same goods: that is to say, first, they might be insured by the
owner, then by the carrier, and afterwards by the warehouseman.
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Now was it not really the"meaning of the parties that the insurance
should be on the goods generally, leaving the assured to make the adjustment amongst the several claimants ? The fact of the plaintiff
not beingliable to the parties whose goods he held, is not material, as
it seems to me that that question also arose in Waters vs. The
Monareh Life and Fire Insurance Company, and the court decided
that nevertheless the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Thit case
seems to me undistinguishable from the present, and it seems to
me the plaint*ff is entitled to insure every interest, although he
would not be liable to the owners in case of loss by fire.
ERLE, J.-On the construction of the policy I agree with the
rest of the court, and on the-terms of that policy I think our judgment should be grounded. I should have been inclined to think
that the carrier intended to insure his own interest, but as he is
liable for loss or damage by fire, as trustee, he insures for the full
amount of value. Then as to the defence that plaintiff and the
defendants contracted that the defendants should be at liberty to set
up any special defence that might arise, it is doubtful whether they
could set up such a special defence, but the case finds that the carriers have paid the senders a part of the value of the goods. If the
company meanto limit their liability they must do it by more distinct
words.
CROMPTON, J.-I
also think that the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover to the extent of the full value insured. The plaintiffs insured as trustees, and the loss is loss of trust property. The plaintiffs
have an insurable interest, but they are bound to pay over the money
received to the owners of the goods, after paying themselves for
their own loss. That was so decided in Waters vs. The Monarch
Company. On the construction of this policy I quite agree with
my brother Erle ; and if the defendants meant to insure on certain
specific terms, they ought to have introduced those terms into the
policy; but, as they have not, we must hold that the insurance was
general, because the condition is, that the policy will not extend to
goods held in trust if they are not declared ; but here the plaintiffs
have declared part of the goods to be held in trust by them as
carriers, and for those goods they are entitled to recover ; after

